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Since the middle 1960s, many Western economies have experienced
persistent and growing rates of inflation. Some prominent economists
and statesmen have become convinced that this inflation has a stubborn,
self-sustaining momentum and that either it simply is not susceptible to
cure by conventional measures of monetary and fiscal restraint or, in
terms of the consequent widespread and sustained unemployment, the
cost of eradicating inflation by monetary and fiscal measures would be
prohibitively high. It is often claimed that there is an underlying rate of
inflation which responds slowly, if at all, to restrictive monetary and fiscal
measures.
1 Evidently, this underlying rate of inflation is the rate of
inflation that firms and workers have come to expect will prevail in the
future. There is momentum in this process because firms and workers
supposedly form their expectations by extrapolating past rates of inflation
into the future. If this is true, the years from the middle 1960s to the early
1980s have left firms and workers with a legacy of high expected rates of
inflation which promise to respond only slowly, if at all, to restrictive
monetary and fiscal policy actions. According to this view, restrictive
monetary and fiscal actions in the first instance cause substantial reduc-
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tions in output and employment but have little, if any, effects in reducing
the rate of inflation. For the economy of the United States, a widely cited
estimate is that for every one percentage point reduction in the annual
inflation rate accomplished by restrictive monetary and fiscal measures,
$220 billion of annual GNP would be lost. For the $2,500 billion United
States economy, the cost of achieving zero percent inflation would be
great, indeed, according to this estimate.
An alternative "rational expectations" view denies that there is any
inherent momentum in the present process of inflation.
2 This view main-
tains that firms and workers have now come to expect high rates of
inflation in the future and that they strike inflationary bargains in light of
these expectations.
1 However, it is held that people expect high rates of
inflation in the future precisely because the government's current and
prospective monetary and fiscal policies warrant those expectations.
Further, the current rate of inflation and people's expectations about
future rates of inflation may well seem to respond slowly to isolated
actions of restrictive monetary and fiscal policy that are viewed as tem-
porary departures from what is perceived as a long-term government
policy involving high average rates of government deficits and monetary
expansion in the future. Thus inflation only seems to have a momentum of
its own; it is actually the long-term government policy of persistently
running large deficits and creating money at high rates which imparts the
momentum to the inflation rate. An implication of this view is that
inflation can be stopped much more quickly than advocates of the
"momentum" view have indicated and that their estimates of the length
of time and the costs of stopping inflation in terms of foregone output
($220 billion of GNP for one percentage point in the inflation rate) are
erroneous. This is not to say that it would be easy to eradicate inflation.
On the contrary, it would require far more than a few temporary restric-
tive fiscal and monetary actions. It would require a change in the policy
regime: there must be an abrupt change in the continuing government
policy, or strategy, for setting deficits now and in the future that is
sufficiently binding as to be widely believed. Economists do not now
possess reliable, empirically tried and true models that can enable them
to predict precisely how rapidly and with what disruption in terms of lost
output and employment such a regime change will work its effects. How
costly such a move would be in terms of foregone output and how long it
would be in taking effect would depend partly on how resolute and
evident the government's commitment was.
This paper describes several dramatic historical experiences which I
believe to be consistent with the "rational expectations" view but which
seem difficult to reconcile with the "momentum" model of inflation. The
idea is to stand back from our current predicament and to examine the
measures that successfully brought drastic inflations under control in43 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
several European countries in the 1920s. I shall describe and interpret
events in Austria, Hungary, Germany, and Poland, countries which
experienced a dramatic "hyperinflation" in which, after the passage of
several months, price indexes assumed astronomical proportions. The
basic data to be studied are the price indexes in figures 2.1-2.4. These
data are recorded in a logarithmic scale, so that they will fit on a page. For
all four countries, and especially Germany, the rise in the price level was
spectacular. The graphs also reveal that in each case inflation stopped
abruptly rather than gradually. I shall also briefly describe events in
Czechoslovakia, a country surrounded by neighbors experiencing hyper-
inflations, but which successfully achieved a stable currency itself. My
reason for studying these episodes is that they are laboratories for the
study of regime changes. Within each of Austria, Hungary, Poland, and
Germany, there occurred a dramatic change in the fiscal policy regime
which in each instance was associated with the end of a hyperinflation.
Further, though it shared some problems with its four neighbors,
Czechoslovakia deliberately adopted a relatively restrictive fiscal policy
regime, with the avowed aim of maintaining the value of its currency.
While there are many differences in details among the Austrian,
Hungarian, Polish, and German hyperinflations, there are some very
important common features. These include the following:
i) The nature of the fiscal policy regime in effect during each of the
hyperinflations. Each of the four countries persistently ran enormous
budget deficits on current account.
ii) The nature of the deliberate and drastic fiscal and monetary mea-
sures taken to end the hyperinflations.
iii) The immediacy with which the price level and foreign exchanges
suddenly stabilized.
4
iv) The rapid rise in the "high-powered" money supply in the months
and years after the rapid inflation had ended.
I shall assemble and interpret the facts in the light of a view about the
forces which give money value and about the way the international
monetary system worked in the 1920s. Before interpreting the historical
facts, I now turn to a brief description of this view.
2.2 The Gold Standard
After World War I, the United States was on the gold standard. The
United States government stood ready to convert a dollar into a specified
amount of gold on demand. To understate things, immediately after the
war, Hungary, Austria, Poland, and Germany were not on the gold
standard. In practice, their currencies were largely "fiat," or unbacked.
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Fig. 2.1 Wholesale prices in Austria.
unbacked money to finance government deficits.
5 This was done on such a
scale that it led to a depreciation of the currencies of spectacular propor-
tions. In the end, the German mark stabilized at 1 trillion (10
12) paper
marks to the prewar gold mark, the Polish mark at 1.8 million paper
marks to the gold zloty, the Austrian crown at 14,400 paper crowns to the
prewar Austro-Hungarian crown, and the Hungarian krone at 14,500
paper crowns to the prewar Austro-Hungarian crown.
6
This paper focuses on the deliberate changes in policy that each of
Hungary, Austria, Poland, and Germany made to end its hyperinflation,
and the deliberate choice of policy that Czechoslovakia made to avoid
inflation in the first place. The hyperinflations were each ended by
restoring or virtually restoring convertibility to the dollar or equivalently
to gold. For this reason it is good to keep in mind the nature of the
restrictions that adherence to the gold standard imposed on a govern-
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Fig. 2.2 Wholesale prices in Hungary.
longer-term debt which it promised to convert into gold under certain
specified conditions, i.e. on demand, for notes. Presumably, people were
willing to hold these claims at full value if the government's promise to
pay were judged to be good. The government's promise to pay was
"backed" only partially by its holding of gold reserves. More important in
practice, since usually a government did not hold 100% reserves of gold,
a government's notes and debts were backed by the commitment of the
government to levy taxes in sufficient amounts, given its expenditures, to
make good on its debt. In effect, the notes were backed by the govern-
ment's pursuit of an appropriate budget policy. During the 1920s, John
Maynard Keynes emphasized that the size of a government's gold reserve
was not the determinant of whether it could successfully maintain con-
vertibility with gold: its fiscal policy was.
7 According to this view, what
mattered was not the current government deficit but the present value of
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Fig. 2.3 Wholesale prices in Poland.
like a firm whose prospective receipts were its future tax collections. The
value of the government's debt was, to a first approximation, equal to the
present value of current and future government surpluses. So under a
gold standard, a government must honor its debts and could not engage in
inflationary finance. In order to assign a value to the government's debt,
it was necessary to have a view about the fiscal policy regime in effect,
that is, the rule determining the government deficit as a function of the
state of the economy now and in the future. The public's perception of the
fiscal regime influenced the value of government debt through private
agents' expectations about the present value of the revenue streams
backing that debt.
8 It will be worthwhile to keep this view of the gold
standard in mind as we turn to review the events surrounding the ends of
the four hyperinflations.
9
However, it will be useful first to expand a little more generally on the














Fig. 2.4 Wholesale prices in Germany.
of a given general strategy, on the one hand, and the effects of choosing
among alternative general strategies or rules for repeatedly taking ac-
tions, on the other. The latter choice I refer to as a choice of regime. The
values of government expenditures and tax rates for one particular quar-
ter are examples of actions, while the rules, implicit or explicit, for
repeatedly selecting government expenditures and tax rates as functions
of the state of the economy are examples of regimes. Recent work in
dynamic macroeconomics has discovered the following general principle:
whenever there is a change in the government strategy or regime, private
economic agents can be expected to change their strategies or rules for
choosing consumption rates, investment rates, portfolios, and so on.
1
0
The reason is that private agents' behavior is selfish, or at least purpose-
ful, so that when the government switches its strategy, private agents
usually find it in their best interests to change theirs. One by-product of
this principle is that most of the empirical relations captured in standard48 Thomas J. Sargent
econometric models cannot be expected to remain constant across con-
templated changes in government policy regimes. For this reason, predic-
tions made under the assumption that such relations will remain constant
across regime changes ought not to be believed. The estimate that a 1%
reduction in inflation would cost $220 billion GNP annually is one example
of such a faulty prediction. When an important change in regime occurs,
dynamic macroeconomics would predict that the entire pattern of cor-
relations among variables will change in quantitatively important ways.
While the distinction between isolated actions and strategy regimes is
clear in principle, it is an admittedly delicate task to interpret whether
particular historical episodes reflect isolated actions within the same old
rules of the game or whether they reflect a new set of rules or government
strategies.
1
1 All that we have to go on are the recorded actions actually
taken, together with the pronouncements of public officials, laws, legisla-
tive votes, and sometimes constitutional provisions. Out of this material
we are to fashion a view about the government strategy being used.
Common sense suggests and technical econometric considerations
confirm the difficulties in making such interpretations in general. Having
said this, I believe that the examples discussed below are about as close to
being laboratories for studying regime changes as history has provided.
2.3 Austria
At the end of World War I, the Austro-Hungarian empire dissolved
into a number of successor states, of which Austria was one. From having
been the center of an empire of 625,000 square kilometers and 50 million
inhabitants, Austria was reduced to a mere 80,000 square kilometers and
6.5 million inhabitants. Having suffered food scarcities during the war
that were produced by an effective Allied blockade, Austria found itself
confronted with new national borders and trade barriers that cut it off
from the food sources formerly within its empire. Further, the govern-
ment of Austria reabsorbed a large number of Austrian imperial bureau-
crats who were no longer welcome in the other successor states. Aus-
trians also faced a large-scale unemployment problem stemming from the
need to reconvert the economy to peaceful activities and to adjust to the
new national borders. If this were not enough, as a loser of the war
Austria owed the Reparation Commission sums that for a long time were
uncertain in amount but were presumed eventually to be substantial. The
Reparation Commission, in effect, held a blanket mortgage against the
assets and revenues of the Austrian government.
Austria responded to these pressing problems by making large expend-
itures in the form of food relief and payments to the unemployed. In
addition, the state railroads and monopolies ran deficits, as taxes and
prices were kept relatively low. The government did not collect enough49 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
taxes to cover expenditures and so ran very substantial deficits during the
years 1919-22 (see table Al). As table Al shows, in these years the deficit
was typically over 50 percent of the total government expenditures. The
government financed these deficits by selling treasury bills to the Austrian
section of the Austro-Hungarian bank. The result was a very rapid
increase in the volume of "high-powered" money, defined as the notes
and demand deposit obligations of the central bank (see table A2). As the
figures in table A2 indicate, between March 1919 and August 1922 the
total note circulation in Austria
1
2 of the Austro-Hungarian bank in-
creased by a factor of 288. This expansion of central bank notes stemmed
mainly from the bank's policy of discounting treasury bills. However, it
also resulted partly from the central bank's practice of making loans and
discounts to private agents at nominal interest rates of between 6 and 9%
per annum, rates which by any standard were far too low in view of the
inflation rate, which averaged 10,000% per annum from January 1921 to
August 1922 (table A3).
1
3
In response to these government actions and what seemed like pros-
pects for their indefinite continuation, the Austrian crown depreciated
internationally and domestic prices rose rapidly (see tables A3 and A4).
While between January 1921 and August 1922 the note circulation of the
central bank increased by a factor of 39, the retail price index increased
by a factor of 110 (see tables A3 and A4) so that the real value of the note
circulation diminished during the currency depreciation.
1
4 The "flight
from the crown" occurred as people chose to hold less of their wealth in
the form of the rapidly depreciating crown, attempting instead to hold
foreign currencies or real assets.
1
5 From the viewpoint of financing its
deficit, the government of Austria had an interest in resisting the flight
from the crown, because this had the effect of diminishing the resources
that the government could command by printing money. Therefore the
government established a system of exchange controls administered by
an agency called the Devisenzentrale. The essential function of this
Table Al Austrian Budgets, 1919-22 (in millions of paper crowns)
1 January-30 June 1919
1 July 1919-30 June 1920
1 July 1920-30 June 1921
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Source: Young [36, vol. 2, p. 292].
agency was to increase the amount of Austrian crowns held by Austrians,
which it accomplished by adopting measures making it difficult or illegal
for Austrians to hold foreign currencies and other substitutes for Aus-
trian crowns.
1
6 Despite these regulations, it is certain that Austrian
citizens were holding large amounts of foreign currencies during 1921 and
1922.
Table A4 reveals that the Austrian crown abruptly stabilized in August
1922, while table A3 indicates that prices abruptly stabilized a month51 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
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Source: Young [36, vol. 2, p. 294].
later. This occurred despite the fact that the central bank's note circula-
tion continued to increase rapidly, as table Al indicates. Furthermore,
there occurred no change in currency units or "currency reform," at least
not for another year and a half.
The depreciation of the Austrian crown was suddenly stopped by the
intervention of the Council of the League of Nations and the resulting
binding commitment of the government of Austria to reorder Austrian
fiscal and monetary strategies dramatically. After Austria's increasingly
desperate pleas to the Allied governments for international aid had
repeatedly been rejected or only partially fulfilled, in late August 1922
the Council of the League of Nations undertook to enter into serious
negotiations to reconstruct the financial system of Austria. These nego-
tiations led to the signing of three protocols on 2 October 1922 which
successfully guided the financial reconstruction of Austria. It is remark-
able that even before the precise details of the protocols were publicly
announced, the fact of the serious deliberations of the Council brought
relief to the situation. This can be seen in tables A3 and A4, and was
described by Pasvolsky as follows:
The moment the Council of the League decided to take up in earnest
the question of Austrian reconstruction, there was immediately a
widespread conviction that the solution of the problem was at hand.
This conviction communicated itself first of all to that delicately ad-
justed mechanism, the international exchange market. Nearly two
weeks before Chancellor Seipel officially laid the Austrian question
before the Council of the League, on August 25, the foreign exchange
rate ceased to soar and began to decline, the internal price level
following suit three weeks later. The printing presses in Austria were53 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
still grinding out new currency; the various ministries were still dispers-
ing this new currency through the country by means of continuing




The first protocol was a declaration signed by Great Britain, France,
Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Austria that reaffirmed the political inde-
pendence and sovereignty of Austria.
1
8 The second protocol provided
conditions for an international loan of 650 million gold crowns to Austria.
The third protocol was signed by Austria alone and laid out a plan for
reconstruction of its fiscal and monetary affairs. The Austrian govern-
ment promised to establish a new independent central bank, to cease
running large deficits, and to bind itself not to finance deficits with
advances of notes from the central bank. Further, the government of
Austria agreed to accept in Austria a commissioner general, appointed by
the Council of the League, who was to be responsible for monitoring the
fulfillment of Austria's commitments. The government of Austria also
agreed to furnish security to back the reconstruction loan. At the same
time, it was understood that the Reparation Commission would give up
or modify its claim on the resources of the government of Austria.
The government of Austria and the League both moved swiftly to
execute the plan outlined in the protocols. In legislation of 14 November
1922, the Austrian National Bank was formed to replace the old Austrian
section of the Austro-Hungarian bank; it was to take over the assets and
functions of the Devisenzentrale. The new bank began operations on 1
January 1923 and was specifically forbidden from lending to the govern-
ment except on the security of an equal amount of gold and foreign assets.
The bank was also required to cover its note issues with certain minimal
proportions of gold, foreign earning assets, and commercial bills. Fur-
ther, once the government's debt to the bank had been reduced to 30
million gold crowns, the bank was obligated to resume convertibility into
gold.
The government moved to balance its budget by taking concrete steps
in several directions. Expenditures were reduced by discharging
thousands of government employees. Under the reconstruction scheme,
the government promised gradually to discharge a total of 100,000 state
employees. Deficits in government enterprises were reduced by raising
prices of government-sold goods and services. New taxes and more
efficient means of collecting tax and custom revenues were instituted.
The results of these measures can be seen by comparing the figures in
table A5 with those in table Al. Within two years the government was
able to balance the budget.
The stabilization of the Austrian crown was not achieved via a currency
reform. At the end of 1924 a new unit of currency was introduced, the
schilling, equal to 10,000 paper crowns. The introduction of this new unit54 Thomas J. Sargent


























Source: Pasvolsky [25, p. 127].
Note: 1 schilling = 10,000 paper crowns.
of currency occurred long after the exchange rate had been stabilized and
was surely an incidental measure.
1
9
Table A2 reveals that from August 1922, when the exchange rate
suddenly stabilized, to December 1924, the circulating notes of the
Austrian central bank increased by a factor of over 6. The phenomenon
of the achievement of price stability in the face of a sixfold increase in the
stock of "high-powered" money was widely regarded by contemporaries
as violating the quantity theory of money, and so it seems to do. How-
ever, these observations are not at all paradoxical when interpreted in the
light of a view which distinguishes sharply between unbacked, or "out-
side," money, on the one hand, and backed, or "inside," money, on the
other hand. In particular, the balance sheet of the central bank and the
nature of its open market operations changed dramatically after the
carrying out of the League's protocols, with the consequence that the
proper intrepretation of the figures on the total note obligations of the
central bank changes substantially. Before the protocols, the liabilities of
the central bank were backed mainly by government treasury bills; that
is, they were not backed at all, since treasury bills signified no commit-
ment to raise revenues through future tax collections. After the execution
of the protocols, the liabilities of the central bank became backed by
gold, foreign assets, and commercial paper, and ultimately by the power
of the government to collect taxes. At the margin, central bank liabilities
were backed 100% by gold, foreign assets, and commercial paper as
notes and the deposits were created through open market operations in
those assets (see table A6). The value of the crown was backed by the
commitment of the government to run a fiscal policy compatible with
maintaining the convertibility of its liabilities into dollars. Given such a
fiscal regime, to a first approximation, the intermediating activities of the
central bank did not affect the value of the crown so long as the assets
purchased by the bank were sufficiently valuable. Thus the sixfold in-
crease in the liabilities of the central bank after the protocols ought not to

























































































































































































































Source: Young [36, vol. 2, p. 291].
hoards of foreign exchange into crowns which is reflected in table A6 is
not surprising since the stabilization of the crown made it a much more
desirable asset to hold relative to foreign exchange.
2
0
The available figures on unemployment indicate that the stabilization
of the crown was attended by a substantial increase in the unemployment
rate, though unemployment had begun to climb well before stabilization
was achieved (see table A7). The number of recipients of state unemploy-56 Thomas J. Sargent
Table A7 Number of Austrian Unemployed


























Source: League of Nations [14, p. 87].
ment benefits gradually climbed from a low of 8,700 in December 1921 to
83,000 in December 1922. It climbed to 167,000 by March 1923, and then
receded to 76,000 in November 1923.
2
1 How much of this unemployment
was due to the achievement of currency stabilization and how much was
due to the real dislocations affecting the Austrian economy cannot be
determined. However, it is true that currency stabilization was achieved
in Austria very suddenly, and with a cost in increased unemployment and
foregone output that was minor compared with the $220 billion GNP that
some current analysts estimate would be lost in the United States per one
percentage point inflation reduction.
2.4 Hungary
Like its old partner in the Hapsburg monarchy, Hungary emerged from
World War I as a country much reduced in land, population, and power.
It retained only 25% of its territory (down from 325,000 square kilome-
ters to 92,000) and only 37% of its population (down from 21 million to
about 8 million). Its financial and economic life was disrupted by the
newly drawn national borders separating it from peoples and economic
institutions formerly within the domain of the Hapsburg monarchy.
At the end of the war, Hungary experienced political turmoil as the
Hapsburg King Charles was replaced by the government of Prince
Karolyi. In March 1919, the Karolyi government was overthrown by the
Bolsheviks under Bela Kun. The regime of Bela Kun lasted only four
months, as Romania invaded Hungary, occupied it for a few weeks, and
then withdrew. A new repressive right wing regime under Admiral
Horthy then took power. The "white terror" against leftists carried out
by supporters of Horthy took even more lives than the "red terror" that
had occurred under Bela Kun.
At the end of the war, the currency of Hungary consisted of the notes of
the Austro-Hungarian bank. By the provisions of the peace treaties of
Trianon and St. Germain, the successor states to the Austro-Hungarian
empire were required to stamp the notes of the Austro-Hungarian bank
that were held by their residents, in effect, thereby recognizing those57 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
notes as debts of the respective new states. Before Hungary executed this
provision of the Treaty of Trianon, the currency situation grew more
complicated, for the Bolshevik regime had access to the plates for print-
ing one- and two-crown Austro-Hungarian bank notes and it used them
to print more notes. The Bolshevik government also issued new so-called
white notes. Each of these Bolshevik-issued currencies was honored by
the subsequent government.
The Austro-Hungarian bank was liquidated at the end of 1919, and it
was replaced by an Austrian section and a Hungarian section. The
functions of the Hungarian section of the old bank were assumed in
August 1921 by a State Note Institute, which was under the control of the
minister of finance. In August 1921, the Note Institute issued its own
notes, the Hungarian krone, in exchange for Hungarian stamped notes of
the Austro-Hungarian bank and several other classes of notes, including
those that had been issued by the Bolshevik regime.
As a loser of the war, Hungary owed reparations according to the
Treaty of Trianon. The Reparation Commission had a lien on the re-
sources of the government of Hungary. However, neither the total
amount owed nor a schedule of payments was fixed for many years after
the war. This circumstance alone created serious obstacles in terms of
achieving a stable value for Hungary's currency and other debts, since the
unclear reparations obligations made uncertain the nature of the re-
sources which backed those debts.
From 1919 until 1924 the government of Hungary ran substantial
budget deficits. The government's budget estimates in table HI are
reported by Pasvolsky substantially to understate the size of the deficits.
2
2
These deficits were financed by borrowing from the State Note Institute,
and were a major cause of a rapid increase in the note and deposit
liabilities of the institute. An additional cause of the increase in liabilities
of the institute was the increasing volume of loans and discounts that it
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low interest rate, in view of the rapid rate of price appreciation, and to a
large extent amounted to simple gifts from the Note Institute to those
lucky enough to receive loans on such generous terms. These private
loans account for a much larger increase in high-powered money in the
Hungarian than in the other three hyperinflations we shall study.
As table H3 shows, the Hungarian krone depreciated rapidly on for-
eign exchange markets, and domestic prices rose rapidly. Between Janu-
ary 1922 and April 1924, the price index increased by a factor of 263. In
the same period, the total notes and deposit liabilities of the Note
Institute increased by a factor of 85, so that the real value of its liabilities
decreased substantially. As in the case of Austria, this decrease was
symptomatic of a "flight from the krone," as residents of Hungary
attempted to economize on their holdings of krones and instead to hold
assets denominated in more stable currencies. As in the case of Austria,
the government of Hungary resisted this trend by establishing in August
1922 a Hungarian Devisenzentrale within the State Note Institute.
Table H3 indicates that in March 1924, the rise in prices and the
depreciation of the krone internationally both abruptly halted. The stabi-
lization occurred in the face of continued expansion in the liabilities of the
central bank, which increased by a factor of 3.15 between March 1924 and
January 1925 (see table H2). This pattern parallels what occurred in
Austria and has a similar explanation.
As in Austria, the financial reconstruction of Hungary was accom-
plished with the intervention of the League of Nations. Together with the
Reparation Commission and the government of Hungary, the League
devised a plan which reduced and clarified the reparations commitment
of Hungary, arranged for an international loan that would help finance
government expenditures, and committed Hungary to establish a bal-
anced budget and a central bank legally bound to refuse any government
demand for unbacked credit. On 21 February 1924, the Reparation
Commission agreed to give up its lien on Hungary's resources so that
these could be used to secure a reconstruction loan. A variety of Western
nations also agreed to give up their liens on Hungary so that the new loan
could successfully be floated.
The League's reconstruction plan was embodied in two protocols. The
first was signed by Great Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Ru-
mania, and Hungary, and guaranteed the "political independence, terri-
torial integrity, and sovereignty of Hungary." The second protocol out-
lined the terms of the reconstruction plan, and committed Hungary to
balance its budget and form a central bank truly independent of the
Finance Ministry. The government was also obligated to accept in Hun-
gary a commissioner general, responsible to the League, to monitor and
supervise the government's fulfillment of its commitment to fiscal and
monetary reform.62 Thomas J. Sargent




























































































































































Source: Young [36, vol. 2, p. 323].
'From July 1921 through November 1923, the index numbers represent retail prices and are
based on 60 commodities with July 1914 = 100. From December 1923 through March 1925,
the figures are based on wholesale prices computed by the Hungarian Central Statistical
Office. They refer to the prices of 52 commodities on the last day of the month with 1913 =
100.
A reconstruction loan of 250 million gold krones was successfully
placed abroad in July 1924. The loan was secured by receipts from
customs duties and sugar taxes, and revenues from the salt and tobacco
monopolies. The purpose of the loan was to give the government a
concrete means of converting future promises to tax into current re-
sources while avoiding the need to place its debt domestically.
By a law of 26 April 1924, the Hungarian National Bank was estab-
lished, and it began operations on 24 June. The bank assumed the assets
and liabilities of the State Note Institute and took over the functions of
the foreign exchange control office, the Devisenzentrale. The bank was
prohibited from making any additional loans or advances to the govern-
ment, except upon full security of gold or foreign bills. The bank was also
required to hold gold reserves of certain specified percentages behind its
liabilities.
The government of Hungary also tried to establish a balanced budget.
Both by cutting expenditures and raising tax collections, the government
was successful in moving quickly to a balanced budget (see table H4).
Indeed, the proceeds of the reconstruction loan were used perceptibly
more slowly than had been anticipated in the reconstruction plan.
As table H2 confirms, the stabilization of the krone was accompanied
by a substantial increase in the total liabilities of the central bank. But as
with Austria, the drastic shift in the fiscal policy regime that occasioned
the stabilization also changed the appropriate interpretation of these
figures. As table H2 indicates and as the regulations governing the bank








































Source: Pasvolsky [25, p. 322].
of the central bank became backed, 100% at the margin, by holdings of
gold, foreign exchange, and commercial paper. In effect, the central
bank's liabilities represented "fiat money" before the League's plan was
in effect; after that plan was in effect, they represented more or less
backed claims on British sterling,
2
3 the foreign currency to which Hungary
pegged its exchange as a condition for British participation in the recon-
struction loan.
Figures on unemployment in Hungary are reported in table H5, and
unfortunately begin only immediately after the price stabilization had
already occurred. All that can be inferred from these figures is that
immediately after the stabilization, unemployment was not any higher
than it was one or two years later. This is consistent either with the
hypothesis that the stabilization process had little adverse effect on
Table H5 Number of Unemployed in Hungary (figures relate only to members
of Union of Socialist Workers, in thousands of workers)











































Source: League of Nations [15, p. 50].65 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
unemployment or with the hypothesis that the adverse effect was so
long-lasting that no recovery occurred within the time span of the figures
recorded. The former hypothesis seems more plausible to me.
2.5 Poland
The new nation of Poland came into existence at the end of World War
I, and was formed from territories formerly belonging to Germany,
Austro-Hungary, and Russia. At the time of its formation, Poland pos-
sessed a varied currency consisting of Russian rubles, crowns of the
Austro-Hungarian bank, German marks, and Polish marks issued by the
Polish State Loan Bank, which had been established by Germany to
control the currency in the part of Poland occupied by Germany during
the war. For Poland, the armistice of 1918 did not bring peace, a costly
war with Soviet Russia being waged until the fall of 1920. Poland was
devastated by the fighting and by Germany's practice of stripping it of its
machinery and materials during World War I.
2
4
The new government of Poland ran very large deficits up to 1924 (see
table PI). These deficits were financed by government borrowing from
the Polish State Loan Bank, which the new government had taken over
from the Germans. From January 1922 to December 1923, the outstand-
ing notes of the Polish State Loan Bureau increased by a factor of 523
(table P2). Over the same period, the price index increased by a factor of





















































Source: Young [36, vol. 2, p. 183].
Note: Conversion from marks to zloty was made on the following basis: 1921, 1 zloty =
303.75 marks. First quarter 1922, 1 zloty = 513.52 marks; second quarter, 691.49 marks;
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2,402 while the dollar exchange rate decreased by a factor of 1,397 (see
tables P3 and P4). As in the other inflations we have studied, the real
value of the note circulation decreased as people engaged in a "flight
from the mark." Extensive government exchange controls were imposed
to resist this trend.
Tables P2 and P3 indicate that the rapid inflation and exchange depre-
ciation both suddenly stopped in January 1924. Unlike the cases of
Austria and Hungary, in Poland the initial stabilization was achieved
without foreign loans or intervention, although later in 1927, after cur-
rency depreciation threatened to renew, a substantial foreign loan was
arranged.
2
5 But in terms of the substantial fiscal and monetary regime
changes that accompanied the end of the inflation, there is much similar-

















































































































Source: Young [36, vol. 2, p. 349].






































































































































































Source: Young [36, vol. 2, p. 350].
changes were a dramatic move toward a balanced government budget
and the establishment of an independent central bank that was prohibited
from making additional unsecured loans to the government. In January
1924, the minister of finance was granted broad powers to effect mone-72 Thomas J. Sargent
tary and fiscal reform. The minister immediately initiated the establish-
ment of the Bank of Poland, which was to assume the functions of the
Polish State Loan Bank. The eventual goal was to restore convertibility
with gold. The bank was required to hold a 30% reserve behind its notes,
to consist of gold and foreign paper assets denominated in stable curren-
cies. Beyond this reserve, the bank's notes had to be secured by private
bills of exchange and silver. A maximum credit to the government of 50
million zlotys was permitted. The government also moved swiftly to
balance the budget (see table PI).
In January 1924, a new currency unit became effective, the gold zloty,
worth 1.8 million paper marks. The zloty was equal in gold content to
19.29 cents.
Table P2 reveals that, from January 1924 to December 1924, the note
circulation of the central bank increased by a factor of 3.2, in the face of
relative stability of the price level and the exchange rate (see tables P3
and P4). This phenomenon matches what occurred in Austria and Hun-





































































































Source: Statistiches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich [33].73 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
gary and has a similar explanation. As table P2 reveals, the increased
note circulation during this period was effectively backed 100% by gold,
foreign exchange, and private paper.
The available figures on unemployment are summarized in table P5.
The stabilization of the price level in January 1924 is accompanied by an
abrupt rise in the number of unemployed. Another rise occurs in July of
1924. While the figures indicate substantial unemployment in late 1924,
unemployment is not an order of magnitude worse than before the
stabilization, and certainly not anywhere nearly as bad as would be
predicted by application of the same method of analysis that was used to
fabricate the prediction for the contemporary United States that each
percentage point reduction in inflation would require a reduction of $220
billion in real GNP.
The Polish zloty depreciated internationally from late 1925 onward but
stabilized in autumn of 1926 at around 72% of its level of January 1924.
At the same time, the domestic price level stabilized at about 50% above
its level of January 1924. The threatened renewal of inflation has been
attributed to the government's premature relaxation of exchange con-





After World War I, Germany owed staggering reparations to the
Allied countries. This fact dominated Germany's public finance from
1919 until 1923 and was a most important force for hyperinflation.
At the conclusion of the war, Germany experienced a political revolu-
tion and established a republican government. The early postwar govern-
ments were dominated by moderate Socialists, who for a variety of
reasons reached accommodations with centers of military and industrial
power of the prewar regime.
2
7 These accommodations in effect under-
mined the willingness and capability of the government to meet its
admittedly staggering revenue needs through explicit taxation.
Of the four episodes that we have studied, Germany's hyperinflation
was the most spectacular, as the figures on wholesale prices and exchange
rates in tables Gl and G2 reveal. The inflation became most severe after
the military occupation of the Ruhr by the French in January 1923. The
German government was determined to fight the French occupation by a
policy of passive resistance, making direct payments to striking workers
which were financed by discounting treasury bills with the Reichsbank.
Table G3 estimates the budget of Germany for 1920 to 1923.
2
8 The
table reveals that, except for 1923, the budget would not have been badly
out of balance except for the massive reparations payments made. The
disruption caused to Germany's finances by the reparations situation is74 Thomas J. Sargent






































































































































































































































































































Source: Young [36, vol. 1, p. 530].
'On basis of prices in reichsmarks. (1 reichsmark = 1 trillion [10
12] former marks.)
surely understated by the reparations figures given in table G3. For one
thing, considerably larger sums were initially expected of Germany than
it ever was eventually able to pay. For another thing, the extent of
Germany's total obligation and the required schedule of payments was
for a long time uncertain and under negotiation. From the viewpoint that
the value of a state's currency and other debt depends intimately on the
fiscal policy it intends to run, the uncertainty about the reparations owed
by the German government necessarily cast a long shadow over its
prospects for a stable currency.
As table G4 reveals, the note circulation of the Reichsbank increased
dramatically from 1921 to 1923, especially in the several months before
November 1923. As pointed out by Young [36], at the end of October
1923, over 99% of outstanding Reichsbank notes had been placed in
circulation within the previous 30 days.
2
9 Table G4 reveals the extent to
which the Reichsbank note circulation was backed by discounted treasury
bills. During 1923, the Reichsbank also began discounting large volumes
of commercial bills. Since these loans were made at nominal rates of
interest far below the rate of inflation, they amounted virtually to govern-
ment transfer payments to the recipients of the loans.
Especially during the great inflation of 1923, a force came into play











































































































































Source: Young [36, vol. 1, p. 532].
'Cents per rentenmark and (after October 1924) per reichsmark. 1 rentenmark is equivalent
to 1 reichsmark or 1 billion former paper marks. The reichsmark is the equivalent of the gold
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Given the method of assessing taxes in nominal terms, lags between the
time when taxes were levied and the time when they were collected led to
reduced revenues as the government evidently repeatedly underesti-
mated the prospective rate of inflation and as the rapid inflation gave
people a large incentive to delay paying their taxes. This effect probably
partially accounts for the reduced tax revenues collected during the first
nine months of 1923. The French occupation of the Ruhr also helps
explain it.
In response to the inflationary public finance and despite the efforts of
the government to impose exchange controls, there occurred a "flight
from the German mark" in which the real value of Reichsmark notes
decreased dramatically. The figures in table Gl indicate that between
January 1922 and July 1923, wholesale prices increased by a factor of
2,038 while Reichsbank notes increased by a factor of 378. Between
January 1922 and August 1923, wholesale prices increased by a factor of
25,723 while Reichsbank notes circulating increased by a factor of 5,748.
The fact that prices increased proportionately many times more than did
the Reichsbank note circulation is symptomatic of the efforts of Germans
to economize on their holdings of rapidly depreciating German marks.
Toward the end of the hyperinflation, Germans made every effort to
avoid holding marks and held large quantities of foreign exchange for
purposes of conducting transaction. By October 1923, it has been roughly
estimated, the real value of foreign currencies circulating in Germany was




The figures in tables Gl and G2 show that prices suddenly stopped
rising and the mark stopped depreciating in late November 1923. The
event of stabilization was attended by a "monetary reform," in which on
15 October 1923 a new currency unit called the Rentenmark was declared
equivalent to 1 trillion (10
12) paper marks. While great psychological
Footnotes to Table G4
Source: Young [36, vol. 1, pp. 528-29].
Note: End of month figures, in thousands of current marks; from January 1924 in thousands
of rentenmarks or reichsmarks. 1 rentenmark is equivalent to 1 reichsmark or 1 trillion (10
12)
former paper marks. The reichsmark is the equivalent of the gold mark worth 23.82 cents.
'The large increase of advances at the close of November 1922 occurred because the
Reichsbank had to take over temporarily the financing of food supplies from the loan
bureaus (Darlehuskassen), as the latter were unable to extend the needed accommodation,
their outstanding notes having reached the maximum amount permitted by law.
2In billions.
3A decree of 15 November 1923 discontinued the discounting of treasury bills by the
Reichsbank.
4See note above.
5Date of first statement of reorganized Reichsbank.83 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
significance has sometimes been assigned to this unit change, it is difficult
to attribute any substantial effects to what was in itself only a cosmetic
measure.
3
1 The substantive aspect of the decree of 15 October was the
establishing of a Rentenbank to take over the note issue functions of the
Reichbank. The decree put binding limits upon both the total volume of
Rentenmarks that could be issued, 3.2 billion marks, and the maximum
amount that could be issued to the government, 1.2 billion marks. This
limitation on the amount of credit that could be extended to the govern-
ment was announced at a time when the government was financing
virtually 100% of its expenditures by means of note issue.
3
2 In December
1923, the management of the Rentenbank was tested by the government
and effectively made clear its intent to meet its obligation to limit govern-
ment borrowing to within the amount decreed.
Simultaneously and abruptly three things happened: additional gov-
ernment borrowing from the central bank stopped, the government
budget swung into balance, and inflation stopped. Table G5 shows the
dramatic progress toward a balanced budget that was made in the months
after the Rentenbank decree.
The government moved to balance the budget by taking a series of
deliberate, permanent actions to raise taxes and eliminate expenditures.
Table G5 Ordinary Revenues and Expenditures of the German Federal
Government (from Wirtschift and Statistik, issued by











































































Source: Young [36, vol. 1, p. 422].84 Thomas J. Sargent
Young reports that "by the personnel decree of October 27, 1923, the
number of government employees was cut by 25 percent; all temporary
employees were to be discharged; all above the age of 65 years were to be
retired. An additional 10 percent of the civil servants were to be dis-
charged by January 1924. The railways, overstaffed as a result of post-war
demobilization, discharged 120,000 men during 1923 and 60,000 more
during 1924. The postal administration reduced its staff by 65,000 men;
the Reichsbank itself which had increased the number of its employees
from 13,316 at the close of 1922 to 22,909 at the close of 1923, began the




Substantially aiding the fiscal situation, Germany also obtained relief
from her reparation obligations. Reparations payments were temporarily
suspended, and the Dawes plan assigned Germany a much more manage-
able schedule of payments.
Table G4 documents a pattern that we have seen in the three other
hyperinflations: the substantial growth of central bank note and demand
deposit liabilities in the months after the currency was stabilized. As in
the other cases that we have studied, the best explanation for this is that at
the margin the postinflation increase in notes was no longer backed by
government debt. Instead, in the German case, it was largely backed by
discounted commercial bills. The nature of the system of promises and
claims behind the central bank's liabilities changed when after the Ren-
tenbank decree the central bank no longer offered additional credit to the
government. So once again the interpretation of the time series on central
bank notes and deposits must undergo a very substantial change.
By all available measures, the stabilization of the German mark was
accompanied by increases in output and employment and decreases in
unemployment.
3
4 While 1924 was not a good year for German business, it
was much better than 1923. Table G6 is representative of the figures
assembled by Graham, and shows that 1924 suffers in comparison with
1922 but that 1925 was a good year. In these figures one cannot find much
convincing evidence of a favorable trade-off between inflation and out-
Table G6 Index of Physical Volume























Source: Graham [7, p. 287].85 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
put, since the year of spectacular inflation, 1923 was a very bad year for
employment and physical production. Certainly a large part of the poor
performance of 1923 was due to the French occupation of the Ruhr and
the policy of passive resistance.
Despite the evident absence of a "Phillips curve" trade-off between
inflation and real output in the figures in tables Gl and G6, there is ample
evidence that the German inflation was far from "neutral" and that there
were important "real effects." Graham [7] gives evidence that the infla-
tion and the associated reduction in real rates of return to "high-
powered" money and other government debt were accompanied by real
overinvestment in many kinds of capital goods.
3
5 There is little doubt that
the "irrational" structure of capital characterizing Germany after stabi-
lization led to subsequent problems of adjustment in labor and other
markets.
2.7 Czechoslovakia
After World War I, the new nation of Czechoslovakia was formed out
of territories formerly belonging to Austria and Hungary. Under the
leadership of a distinguished minister of finance, Dr. Alois Rasin, im-
mediately after the war Czechoslovakia adopted the conservative fiscal
and monetary policies its neighbors adopted only after their currencies
had depreciated radically. As a result, Czechoslovakia avoided the
hyperinflation experienced by its neighbors.
Under Rasin's leadership, Czechoslovakia early on showed that it was
serious about attaining a stable currency. Even before the peace treaties
required it, Czechoslovakia stamped the Austro-Hungarian notes then
circulating within its border with the Czechoslovakian stamp, thereby
recognizing them as its own debt. There was considerable drama associ-
ated with this event, as the National Assembly passed the plans for
stamping in secret sessions on 25 February 1919. From 26 February to 9
March, the frontiers of the country were unexpectedly closed and foreign
mail service was closed. Only Austro-Hungarian notes circulating within
the country could be presented for stamping. As part of the stamping
process, the government retained part of the notes in the form of a forced
loan.
3
6 About 8 billion crowns were stamped.
A banking office in the Ministry of Finance took over the affairs of the
old Austro-Hungarian bank. Czechoslovakia moved quickly to limit by
statute the total government note circulation and to prevent inflationary
government finance. A law of 10 April 1919 strictly limited the fiduciary
or unbacked note circulation of the banking office to about 7 billion
crowns. This law was obeyed, and forced the government to finance its
expenditures by levying taxes or else issuing debt, which, because of the86 Thomas J. Sargent
statutory restriction on government note issues, were interpreted as
promises to tax in the future.
From 1920 on, Czechoslovakia ran only modest deficits on current
account (see table Cl). Among other taxes, Czechoslovakia imposed a
progressive capital levy on property, which raised a cumulative amount of
about 11 billion crowns by 1925. It also imposed an increment tax on the
increased wealth individuals had obtained during the war.
Table C2 shows the note and deposit liabilities of the banking office.












Czechoslovakia, Receipts and Expenditures, 1919-25 (exclusive of





























































































































Source: Young [36, vol. 2, p. 71].87 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
Table C3 shows the path of exchange rates and how, after declining
until November 1921, the Czechoslovakian crown rapidly gained to about
3 United States cents.
Table C4 shows the price levels. From 1922 to 1923, Czechoslovakia
actually experienced a deflation. Indeed, Rasin's initial plan had been to
Table C2 Note Issue of Banking Office of Czechoslovakia, 1919-24
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Young [36, vol. 2, p. 307].
Note: July 1914 = 100.
restore the Czechoslovakia crown to the prewar gold par value of the old
Austro-Hungarian crown. Following Rasin's assassination, this plan was
abandoned and the crown was stabilized at about 2.96 cents.
2.8 Conclusion
The essential measures that ended hyperinflation in each of Germany,
Austria, Hungary, and Poland were, first, the creation of an independent
central bank that was legally committed to refuse the government's
demand for additional unsecured credit and, second, a simultaneous
alteration in the fiscal policy regime.
3
7 These measures were interrelated
and coordinated. They had the effect of binding the government to place
its debt with private parties and foreign governments which would value
that debt according to whether it was backed by sufficiently large
prospective taxes relative to public expenditures. In each case that we
have studied, once it became widely understood that the government
would not rely on the central bank for its finances, the inflation termi-
nated and the exchanges stabilized. We have further seen that it was not
simply the increasing quantity of central bank notes that caused the90 Thomas J. Sargent
hyperinflation, since in each case the note circulation continued to grow
rapidly after the exchange rate and price level had been stabilized.
Rather, it was the growth of fiat currency which was unbacked, or backed
only by government bills, which there never was a prospect to retire
through taxation.
The changes that ended the hyperinflations were not isolated restric-
tive actions within a given set of rules of the game or general policy.
Earlier attempts to stabilize the exchanges in Hungary under Hegedus,
3
8
and also in Germany, failed precisely because they did not change the
rules of the game under which fiscal policy had to be conducted.
3
9
In discussing this subject with various people, I have encountered the
view that the events described here are so extreme and bizarre that they
do not bear on the subject of inflation in the contemporary United States.
On the contrary, it is precisely because the events were so extreme that
they are relevant. The four incidents we have studied are akin to labora-
tory experiments in which the elemental forces that cause and can be used
to stop inflation are easiest to spot. I believe that these incidents are full of
lessons about our own, less drastic predicament with inflation, if only we
interpret them correctly.
Notes
1. "Most economists believe that the underlying inflation rate—roughly defined as wage
costs less productivity gains—now stands at 9 to 10 percent, and that only a long period of
restraint can reduce that rate significantly" (Newsweek, 19 May 1980, p. 59).
2. Paul Samuelson has aptly summarized the rational expectations view: "I should report
that there is a new school, the so-called 'rational expectationists.' They are optimistic that
inflation can be wiped out with little pain if only the government makes credible its
determination to do so. But neither history nor reason tempt one to bet their way"
(Newsweek, 28 April 1980). The second sentence of this quote is probably as shrewd a
summary of the rational expectations view as can be made in a single sentence. However, it
is difficult to agree with the third sentence: as for "reason," no one denies that logically
coherent and well-reasoned models underlie the claims of the "rational expectationists"; as
for history, the evidence summarized in this paper is surely relevant.
3. There is actually no such thing as a "rational expectations school" in the sense of a
collection of economists with an agreed upon model of the economy and view about optimal
monetary and fiscal policy. In fact, among economists who use the assumption of rational
expectations there is wide disagreement about these matters. What characterizes adherents
of the notion of rational expectations is their intention to build models by assuming that
private agents understand the dynamic environment in which they operate approximately as
well as do government policymakers. Adherence to this notion leaves ample room for
substantial diversity about the many other details of a model. For some examples of rational
expectations models with diverse implications, see Lucas [21], Barro [2], Wallace [35],
Townsend [34], and Sargent and Wallace [31]. Despite their diversity, it is true that all of
these models impel us to think about optimal government policy in substantially different
ways than were standard in macroeconomics before the advent of the doctrine of rational
expectations in the early 1970s.91 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
4. Bresciani-Turroni wrote: "Whoever studies the recent economic history of Europe is
struck by a most surprising fact: the rapid monetary restoration of some countries where for
several years paper money had continually depreciated. In some cases the stabilization of
the exchange was not obtained by a continuous effort, prolonged over a period of years,
whose effects would show themselves slowly in the progressive economic and financial
restoration of the country, as occurred before the War in several well-known cases of
monetary reform. Instead, the passing from a period of tempestuous depreciation of the
currency to an almost complete stability of the exchange was very sudden" [3, p. 334].
Compare these remarks with the opinion of Samuelson cited in note 2 above.
5. The notes were "backed" mainly by treasury bills which, in those times, could not be
expected to be paid off by levying taxes, but only by printing more notes or treasury bills.
6. League of Nations [13, p. 101].
7. Keynes wrote: "It is not lack of gold but the absence of other internal adjustments
which prevents the leading European countries from returning to a pre-war gold standard.
Most of them have plenty of gold for the purpose as soon as the other conditions favorable to
the restoration of a gold standard have returned" (Keynes [11, p. 132]). Writing about
Germany in 1923, Keynes said: "The government cannot introduce a sound money,
because, in the absence of other revenue, the printing of an unsound money is the only way
by which it can live" (Keynes [10, p. 67]).
8. This view can be expressed more precisely by referring to the technical literature of
optimum economic growth. I am recommending that a good first model of the gold standard
or other commodity money is a real equilibrium growth model in which a government issues
debt, makes expenditures, and collects taxes. Examples of these models were studied by
Arrow and Kurz [1]. In such models, government debt is valued according to the same
economic considerations that give private debt value, namely, the prospective net revenue
stream of the institution issuing the debt. A real equilibrium growth model of this kind can
also be used to provide a formal rationalization of my claim below that open market
operations in private securities, foreign exchange, and gold should have no effect on the
price level, i.e. the value of government demand debt.
9. It is relatively straightforward to produce a variety of workable theoretical models of a
commodity money or gold standard, along the lines of note 8. It is considerably more
difficult to produce a model of a fiat money, which is costless to produce, inconvertible, and
of no utility except in exchange. Kareken and Wallace [9], Wallace [35], and Townsend [34]
describe some of the ramifications of this observation. The workable models of fiat money
that we do have—for example, those of Townsend [34] and Wallace [35]—immediately raise
the question of whether voluntarily held fiat money can continue to be valued at all in the
face of substantial budget deficits of the order of magnitude studied in this paper. Such
models lead one to assign an important role to government restrictions, particularly on
foreign exchange transactions, in maintaining a valued, if involuntarily held, fiat money.
Keynes [10] and Nichols [24] also emphasized the role of such restrictions.
10. The sweeping implications of this principle for standard ways of formulating and
using econometric models were first described by Lucas [19]. The principle itself has
emerged in a variety of contexts involving economic dynamics. For some examples, see
Lucas [20] and Sargent and Wallace [30].
11. Sargent and Wallace [32] describe a sense in which it might be difficult to imagine that
a regime change can occur. As they discovered, thinking about regime changes in the
context of rational expectations models soon leads one to issues of free will.
12. The Treaty of St. Germain, signed in September of 1919, required the successor
states of the Austro-Hungarian empire to stamp their share of the notes of the Austro-
Hungarian bank. The stamp converted those notes to the currency, i.e. debt, of the new
states. The Austrian section of the old Austro-Hungarian bank functioned as the central
bank of Austria for several years after the war.
13. Needless to say, the central bank encountered a strong demand for loans at this rate
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14. At the time, some commentators argued that since the real value of currency had
decreased and so in a sense currency was scarce, the increased note issue of the central bank
was not the prime cause of the inflation. Some even argued that money was "tight" and that
the central bank was valiantly struggling to meet the shortage of currency by adding printing
presses and employees. This argument is now widely regarded as fallacious by macroecono-
mists. Disturbingly, however, one hears the very same argument in the contemporary
United States.
15. "In Vienna, during the period of collapse, mushroom exchange banks sprang up at
every street corner, where you could change your krone into Zurich francs within a few
minutes of receiving them, and so avoid the risk of loss during the time it would take you to
reach your usual bank. It became a reasonable criticism to allege that a prudent man at a
cafe ordering a bock of beer should order a second bock at the same time, even at the
expense of drinking it tepid, lest the price should rise meanwhile" (Keynes [10, p. 51]).
16. See Young [36, vol. 2, p. 16]. That a government might want to adopt such measures
if it were using inflationary finance was pointed out by Nichols [24].
17. Pasvolsky [25, p. 116].
18. The content of this protocol is highly sensible when it is remembered that the value of
a state's currency and other debt, at least under the gold standard, is determined by its
ability to back that debt with an appropriate fiscal policy. In this respect, its situation is no
different from that of a firm. In 1922, there was widespread concern within and without
Austria that its sovereignty was at risk. (See the desperate note delivered by the Austrian
minister to the Supreme Council of the Allied governments quoted by Pasvolsky [25, p.
115]). The first protocol aimed to clarify the extent to which Austria remained a political and
economic entity capable of backing its debts. A similar protocol was signed at the inception
of Hungary's financial reconstruction.
19. It should be noted that for two years the new bank vigorously exercised its authority
to control transactions in foreign currency. Only after March 1925 were restrictions on
trading foreign exchange removed.
20. This explanation is consistent with the argument advanced by Fama [6]. There is an
alternative explanation of these observations that neglects the distinction between inside
and outside money, and that interprets the observations in terms of a demand function for
the total quantity of "money." For instance, Cagan [4] posited the demand schedule for
money to take the form
(1) Mt-Pt = *{E,Pt+x-Pt), a<0,
where P, is the logarithm of the price level, M, is the logarithm of the money supply, and
EtPt+i is people's expectation of the log of price next period. There is always a problem in
denning an empirical counterpart to A/,, but it is often taken to be the note and deposit
liabilities of the central bank or "high-powered" money. The money demand schedule or
"portfolio balance" schedule incorporates the idea that people want to hold less wealth in
the form of real balances the faster the currency is expected to depreciate. Equation (1) can
be solved to give an expression for the equilibrium price level of the form
(2) Pt = J-
1
where EtMt+i is what at time t people expect the money supply to be at time t + i.
Consider the following two experiments. First, suppose that the government engages in a
policy, which everyone knows in advance, of making the money supply grow at the constant
high rate (JL > 0 from time 0 to time T - 1, and then at the rate zero from time T onward. In
this case, the inflation rate would follow the path depicted in figure 2.N.I.
For the second experiment, suppose that initially everyone expected the money supply to
increase at the constant rate |x forever but that at time Tit becomes known that henceforth
the money supply will increase at the rate 0 forever. In this case, the inflation rate takes a93 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
0
0
Fig. 2.N.1 Inflation path with an expected decrease in money supply
growth from |x to 0 at time T.
sudden drop at time T, as shown by the path in figure 2.N.2. Now since the inflation and the
expected inflation rate experience a sudden drop at Tin this case, it follows from equation
(1) that real balances must increase at T. This will require a sudden once and for all drop in
the price level at T.
This second example of a previously unexpected decrease in the inflation rate provides
the material for an explanation of the growth of the money supplies after currency stabiliza-
tion. In the face of a previously unexpected, sudden, and permanent drop in the rate of




Fig. 2.N.2 Inflation path with a previously unexpected decrease in money
supply growth from |x to 0 at time T.94 Thomas J. Sargent
accompany the decrease in the rate of money creation with a once and for all increase in the
money supply. In order to stabilize the price level in the face of a decreased rate of change of
money, the level of the money supply must jump upward once and for all.
What actually occurred in the four countries studied here was not a once and for all jump
but a gradual increase in the money supply over many months. This could be reconciled with
the observations within the model (1) if people were assumed only gradually to catch on to
the fact of stabilization and to decrease the rate of inflation that they expected as the
currency stabilization continued to hold. I find this explanation hard to accept, but it is a
possibility.
An alternative way to reconcile the preceding explanation with the gradual upward
movement of "high-powered" money after the stabilizations is to add adjustment lags to the
portfolio balance schedule (1). For example, consider replacing (1) with
(1') (M, ~ P.) = a(EtPt+1 - Pt) + X(M,_, - Pr_,) ct<O,O<\<l.
In this case, an abrupt stabilization of expected inflation induces only a gradual adjustment
of real balances upward at the rate of 1 - X. per period. My own preference at this point is for
an explanation that stresses the distinction between backed and unbacked money.
21. See Pasvolsky [25, p. 161].
22. See Pasvolsky [25, p. 298].
23. Within a year and a half, these became a claim on gold as Britain returned to the gold
standard.
24. Unlike Austria, Hungary, and Germany, Poland did not owe war reparations.
25. League of Nations [13, p. 111].
26. Ibid., p. 108.
27. See the account in Paxton [26, pp. 146-50].
28. Also see Graham [7, pp. 40-41].
29. Keynes wrote: "A government can live for a long time, even the German government
or the Russian government, by printing paper money ... A government can live by this
means when it can live by no other" (Keynes [10, p. 47]).
30. See Young [36, vol. 1, p. 402] and Bresciani-Turroni [3, p. 345].
31. After reading an earlier draft of this paper, John Kennan directed me to the following
passage in Constance Reid's biography of the mathematician Hilbert: "In 1923 the inflation
ended abruptly through the creation of a new unit of currency called the Rentenmark.
Although Hilbert remarked sceptically, 'One cannot solve a problem by changing the name
of the independent variable,' the stability of conditions was gradually restored" (Reid [27,
pp. 162-63]).
32. Young [36, vol. 1, p. 421].
33. Young [36, vol. 1, p. 422].
34. See Graham [7, chapter 12].
35. Theoretical models of money along the lines proposed by Samuelson [29] predict that
too much capital will be accumulated when the government fiscal policy is so profligate that
money becomes valueless. See Samuelson [29] and Wallace [35].
36. The frontiers were closed to prevent notes from Austria and Hungary from entering
the country. The Treaty of St. Germain, signed 10 September 1919, provided that the
successor states should stamp the Austro-Hungarian notes, signifying their assumption of
the debt.
37. Of inflationary finance, Keynes wrote: "It is common to speak as though, when a
government pays its way by inflation, the people of the country avoid taxation. We have
seen this is not so. What is raised by printing notes is just as much taken from the public as is
beer-duty or an income-tax. What a government spends the public pay for. There is no such
thing as an uncovered deficit. But in some countries it seems possible to please and content
the public, for a time at least, by giving them, in return for the taxes they pay, finely95 The Ends of Four Big Inflations
engraved acknowledgments on water-marked paper. The income tax receipts, which we in
England receive from the surveyor, we throw into the wastepaper basket; in Germany they
call them bank-notes and put them into their pocketbooks; in France they are termed
Rentes and are locked up in the family safe" (Keynes [10, pp. 68-69]).
38. See Pasvolsky [25, pp. 304-7].
39. A deep objection to the interpretation in this paragraph can be constructed along the
lines of Sargent and Wallace [30], who argue that for a single economy it is impossible to
conceive of a rational expectations model in which there can occur a change in regime. In
particular, the substantial changes in ways of formulating monetary and fiscal policy
associated with the ends of the four inflations studied here can themselves be considered to
have been caused by the economic events preceding them. On this interpretation, what we
have interpreted as changes in the regime were really only the realization of events and
human responses under a single, more complicated regime. This more complicated regime
would have to be described in a considerably more involved and "state contingent" way
than the simple regimes we have described. I believe that the data of this paper could be
described using this view, but that it would substantially complicate the language and
require extensive qualifications without altering the main practical implications.
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